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Insider Threat Mitigation Project

A Dynamic Network Approach

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– Neal Altman
– Geoff Morgan
– Matt Benigni

SEI:
– Matthew Collins
– Andrew Moore
– Dr. William Claycomb

Emergence of Threat – Ego centered analysis of specific cases

Approach:

- Semi-automated coding with fine-tuning to add dates
- Extract meta-networks one per year
- Comparison at “role” level
- Apply network analytics and visualization

Walker – Gang example
Case records/searches
(open-source)



Manning – Lone Wolf
example open-source





Increasing betweenness during spy activities



Findings on Insiders:

- **Special characteristics**
- **Access**
- **Increasing betweenness**
- **Disrupted family network**

Emergence of Threat – Email centered analysis of possible anomalies

Approach:

- Networks formed from meta-data
- One network per year
- Segment internal from internal-to-external communication
- Remove suspected distribution lists
- Identify “normal behavior” using Enron
- Develop pattern for “insiders” in contrast to “normal” using Enron
- Apply to anonymized SEI email







Findings on SEI -v- Enron:

- **SEI—more email, proportions similar**
- **Both—dominant dense core with numerous stars**



Enron core for 2001—
Newman group coloring



SEI core for 2013—
Newman group coloring

Findings on “Insiders”—those accused:

- **Are not “top” network actors**
- **Form a densely connected sub-group**
- **High level of in-group communication**
- **Low out-group communication**

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